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SECURITIES LAW 
McCORMICK V. FUND AMERICAN 
COMPANIES: ALTERING THE TOTAL MIX OF 
INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE DURING 
. DISCLOSURE IN CORPORATE 
REPURCHASES OF STOCK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In McCormick v. Fund American Companies,l the Ninth 
Circuit granted summary judgment to defendant corporation 
over plaintiff shareholder's claim that defendant had violated 
the Securities Exchange Act2 by misrepresenting or omitting 
material information during negotiations to repurchase stock 
from plaintiff.3 The court found that in light of plaintiff's sta-
tus as a "sophisticated business executive,"4 defendant's al-
leged misrepresentations and omissions did not "significantly 
alter the total mix of information made available"5 concerning 
the contemplated sale of a subsidiary company of defendant 
1. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1994) (per Fletcher, 
J.; the other panel members were Kozinski, J., and Trott, J.). 
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b) states in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [tjo use or em-
ploy, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity . . . , any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. . 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). 
3. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 884. 
4. [d. at 879. 
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corporation.6 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The plaintiff, William M. McCormick, was a stockholder in 
defendant Fund American Companies (FAC),7 the parent com-
pany of Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (FFIC).s 
In May 1990, F AC repurchased from McCormick his out-
standing shares of FAC stock.9 Three months later, FAC sold 
its full interest in FFIC to Allianz, a large German insurance 
company.lO As a result of the sale, the price of FAC stock rose 
dramatically, and McCormick consequently requested a price 
adjustment on the repurchased stock to reflect the increased 
price of F AC shares. 11 
6.Id. 
7. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1994). McCormick 
was CEO of Fireman's Fund Insurance Company from 1983 until his resignation 
in 1989. At the time of his resignation, McCormick owned approximately 500,000 
performance shares and option shares of FAC stock, the vesting period of which 
ran through 1991. Id. 
8. Id. FFIC was wholly-owned by FAC. Id. 
9. Id. at 874. The negotiations for repurchase of McCormick's FFIC stock 
began on April 27, 1990. On May 14, 1990, FAC told McCormick that $38 per 
share was the last offer FAC would make to McCormick that year and on May 
15, McCormick signed the buyout agreement. At the time of the signing, FAC had 
disclosed nothing to McCormick concerning its intention to sell some or all of its 
interest in FFIC. Id. Upon counsel's advice, the chief financial officer of FAC met 
with McCormick on May 16, 1990 to disclose non public information regarding the 
sale of FFIC. Id. at 874-75. Specifically included in this disclosure was mention 
that the success of the sale would likely cause a considerable increase in the price 
of FAC stock. Upon conclusion of the meeting, FAC issued and McCormick signed 
an acknowledgment form summarizing the information disclosed. Id. at 874. Al-
though the disclosure meeting took place the day after consummation of the repur-
chase, McCormick's counsel conceded at oral argument that the parties' under-
standing at the time would have allowed McCormick to back out of the bargain 
after the disclosure. Id. at 875 n.2. 
10. Id. at 873-75. Some debate exists as to when negotiations for the sale of 
FFIC actually began with Allianz, for the transaction was conducted through the 
efforts of an investment banker from Lehman Brothers, and it is unclear when 
FAC authorized his representation. Id. at 878-79. Despite McCormick's claims and 
a dated retainer agreement to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that 
the banker's initial contacts with Allianz were not in representation of FAC. Id. 
11. Id. at 875. Due to the sale of FFIC, FAC stock rose from approximately 
$31 per share to approximately $50 per share. Id. McCormick's 500,000 shares 
thus would have been worth an additional five million dollars had he retained 
them. Id. at 874-75. 
2
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Upon FAC's refusal, McCormick instituted proceedings 
against F AC, claiming that F AC had omitted and misrepre-
sented material information regarding the likelihood of the 
sale of FFIC in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,12 and Code of Federal Regulations Rule 
10b-5.13 
The district court granted summary judgment to F AC and 
McCormick appealed to the Ninth Circuit.14 
III. BACKGROUND 
The Securities Act of 1933 proscribes, with exceptions, the 
use of any means of interstate commerce or the mails to offer 
to sell or buy a security unless the security is registered with 
the Securities Exchange Commission.16 Once registered, the 
corporation issuing the security is subject to various disclosure 
and reporting requirements, including section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.16 Under this section and its 
expansion by Code of Federal Regulations Rule lOb-5, a person 
can be liable for materially misleading representations or omis-
sions made in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties. 17 
12. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 872-73. For pertinent provision of Securities Ex-
change Act § 10(b), see supra note 2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) is the statutory 
codification of Securities Exchange Act § 10(b). 
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). Rule 10b-5 extends the "employment of ma-
nipulative and deceptive devices" to include oral misrepresentations or omissions 
and states in part that "lilt shall be unlawful for any person . . . Itlo make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading .... " Id. 
McCormick also brought claims for violation of state securities laws, breach 
of fiduciary duty, fraud, and deceit. The court held that federal standards of mate-
riality applied to these state claims, and dismissed them as well. McCormick, 26 
F.3d at 884. 
14. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 872. 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1988) (Securities Act of 1933, § 5). For exceptions see 28 
U.S.C. § 77(c), (d). 
16. See supra note 2 for the pertinent text of § 10(b). 
17. See supra notes 12-13. See also Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (omissions not materially misleading in light of circumstances). 
3
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In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,18 the United States Supreme 
Court considered various tests for determining materiality in 
the section lO(b) context.19 Basic Inc. stemmed from a petition 
by the class of former Basic shareholders claiming that Basic 
had released false or misleading statements concerning a forth-
coming merger.20 The Court ultimately adopted for section 
lO(b) cases the test detailed in TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 21 which makes a fact material if there is "a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made avail-
able. »22 The Court further noted that in cases where the event 
in question is speculative, this determination includes a bal-
18. 485 U.S. 224 (1987). 
19. Id. at 231-38. The Court considered three tests: (1) the TSC Industries 
test, described infra note 21 and accompanying text; (2) the "agreement-in-princi-
pIe" test, under which preliminary merger discussions do not become material 
until the would-be merger partners have reached agreement as to the price and 
structure of the transaction; and (3) the test used by the court of appeals in that 
case, in which information concerning otherwise insignificant developments becomes 
material solely because of an affirmative denial of the developments' existence. The 
Court expressly rejected the latter two tests. Id. at 237-38. 
20. Id. at 226-30. Basic Inc. and Combustion Engineering, Inc. conducted ex-
tensive negotiations to merge for approximately two years. During that time, Basic 
made three public statements denying that any merger negotiations were taking 
place or that it knew of any facts that would account for heavy trading activity in 
its stock. Each member of the class of plaintiffs sold their stock between the first 
statement denying a merger and the suspension of trading activity just prior to 
the merger announcement. They filed suit based on section lO(b) violations. Id. 
21. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). TSC Industries considered the materiality of informa-
tion presented in a joint proxy statement issued to shareholders of defendant cor-
porations National Industries and TSC Industries. National bought a 34% voting 
interest of TSC from TSC's founder and principal shareholder. The founder 
promptly resigned from the board of directors of TSC and five National nominees 
were subsequently elected. The board thereafter approved a proposal to liquidate 
and sell TSC's assets to National. TSC and National issued a joint proxy state-
ment to their shareholders recommending approval of the proposal, which was 
ultimately obtained, and the liquidation and sale were effected. Plaintiff was a 
TSC shareholder who filed suit against TSC claiming that the joint proxy state-
ment was incomplete and materially misleading in violation of Securities Exchange 
Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). Plaintiff asserted that the statement omit-
ted material facts relating to the degree of National's control over TSC and to the 
favorability of the terms of the proposal. Id. at 440-43. 
22. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976». The Court in TSC Indus. stated 
that to alter the total mix of information, there must be a showing of a substan-
tial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have as-
sumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. TSC 
Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. 
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ancing of the magnitude of the corporate event and the likeli-
hood that the event will occur.23 The Court concluded by not-
ing that materiality is fact-specific and must therefore be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis.24 
Kohler v. Kohler CO. 25 also addressed section lO(b) disclo-
sure requirements. In Kohler, the Seventh Circuit was con-
fronted with the question of whether section lO(b) applied to 
entities other than persons with material, non public informa-
tion.26 The court held that while the text of section lO(b) 
speaks only to "person[s],"27 the provision's requirements "ap-
ply not only to majority stockholders of corporations and corpo-
rate insiders, but equally to corporations themselves. "28 
Despite this clear progression of section lO(b) analysis, 
precedent could not provide a summary answer for the ques-
tion McCormick presented to the Ninth Circuit.29 The facts 
indicated, and McCormick did not contest, that the possibility 
of the sale of FFIC was disclosed to him.30 McCormick's con-
tention was that F AC had omitted and misrepresented materi-
al information concerning the likelihood of the sale of FFIC 
which, if properly disclosed, would have altered the total mix 
of information.31 
23. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968». 
24. Id. at 238-41. 
25. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). In Kohler, defendant Kohler Co., a corpora-
tion, repurchased plaintiff shareholder's stock. Plaintiff claimed a violation of sec-
tion 10(b) asserting that the book value of the stock differed according to the 
accounting method utilized in determining the price; that defendant utilized a 
method that caused the lower price to be reflected; and that defendant knew this 
to be true but failed to inform plaintiff before repurchasing plaintiffs securities. 
Id. at 635-37. 
26. Id. at 637-38. 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78 j(b) (1988) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b». 
28. Kohler, 319 F.2d at 638. The court emphasized that in such cases the duty 
to disclose is necessarily limited to an exercise of fair and honest business practic-
es under all the circumstances existing at the time of the transaction. Id. at 641. 
29. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 877. 
30. Id.; see supra note 9. 
31. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 877. 
5
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In examining plaintiffs claim, the Ninth Circuit first con-
sidered whether F AC had a duty to disclose material informa-
tion to McCormick, and then appraised the materiality of 
FAC's alleged misrepresentations and omissions.32 
A. FAC OWED A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE TO MCCORMICK 
The Ninth Circ;uit applied the well-established principle 
that a corporate issuer has a duty to either disclose nonpublic, 
material information to its stockholders or refrain from repur-
chasing its securities.33 However, the court's inquiry into this 
aspect of McCormick's claim was only cursory, for the duty 
element of section lO(b) was not strenuously contested by 
FAC.34 Accordingly, the court held that FAC owed a duty to 
McCormick, but emphasized that the crux of the case revolved 
around the materiality of the information at issue.35 
B. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LIKELIHOOD 
OF SALE OF FFIC WOULD NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY 
ALTERED THE TOTAL MIX OF INFORMATION MADE 
AVAILABLE TO MCCORMICK 
The Ninth Circuit reiterated that the Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson test for materiality in the section lO(b) contexeS 
makes a fact material if there is "a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by 
32. [d. at 875. 
33. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., 
Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1572-75 (11th Cir. 1990); Kohler v. 
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963); Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 
F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
34. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 875. The court notes that FAC's conduct of having 
the disclosure meeting with McCormick indicated that it recognized a duty to 
disclose, but that FAC "distanced" itself from that position during oral arguments 
and in the course of litigation. The court summarily held that the original position 
was the correct one. [d. at 875-76. 
35. [d. at 876. 
36. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-32 (1988) (adopting holdings from 
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) and SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969». 
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the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
'total mix' of information made available."37 The court also 
acknowledged Basic [nc.'s balancing test.3S The Ninth Circuit 
then examined the eight alleged omissions and seven alleged 
misrepresentations to determine whether they singly or as a 
whole were both material and misleading.39 
Throughout its analysis, the court explicitly and implicitly 
stressed the importance of the plaintiff as a "sophisticated 
business executive.,,40 The court noted that "McCormick was a 
sophisticated businessman, and he was the former CEO of 
FFIC and a direetor of F AC at the time of the events in ques-
tion. His reading of the Acknowledgement must be seen 
against that background."41 Consequently, the court consid-
ered McCormick's sophistication as it determined the material-
ity of each alleged omission and misrepresentation.42 
37. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994); see supra 
note 21 and accompanying text. 
38. Id. The test weighs the magnitude of the corporate event in question 
against the likelihood that the event will occur. Id. 
39. Id. at 878-83. The eight alleged omissions were: (1) FAC retained Lehman 
Brothers, as of January 15, to sell FFIC; (2) in February, FAC committed in writ-
ing to entertain the sale of FFIC; (3) FAC pursued Allianz and conducted face-to-
faee negotiations in Germany; (4) nonpublic information had already been fur-
nished to Allianz; (5) after review of nonpublic information, Allianz asked for fur-
ther discussions; (6) FAC had agreed to buy back FFIC portfolio assets; (7) FAC 
had agreed to reinsure up to 50% of FFIC's reserves; and (8) FAC and Lusardi 
[investment banker from Lehman Brothers] had planned meetings with a tax ex-
pert to discuss post-sale holding company issues. Id. 
The seven statements that McCormick alleged were misrepresentations were: 
(1) a confidentiality letter was sent to Allianz; (2) preliminary discussions were 
about to start; (3) the buyer's due diligence had not yet begun; (4) Byrne [CEO 
and chairman of the board of F AC] did not know about the Allianz developments 
when he proposed the buyout on April 27; (5) Byrne did not want to sell FFIC, 
(6) the potential buyer could not meet Byrne's price; and (7) the Allianz develop-
ment was a sudden one, and was unlikely to materialize. Id. 
40. Id. at 879-84. The court borrowed this terminology from Jensen v. Kimble, 
1 F.3d 1073, 1078 n.9 (lOth Cir. 1993), in which the Tenth Circuit held that no 
liability existed because the defendant there had "specifically advised" the plaintiff 
of the points which would not be disclosed. 
41. Id. at 884. 
42. Id. at 878-83. The Ninth Circuit placed explicit emphasis on McCormick's 
sophistication in its analysis of the third and fifth alleged omissions. Id. at 879-80. 
The court also placed implied emphasis on McCormick's sophistication in its analy-
sis of the fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth alleged omissions and the first and 
fifth alleged misrepresentations. In each of these latter instances, the court stated 
that McCormick should have or could have inferred the information claimed un-
available from the information already known to him. [d. at 880-82. For further 
7
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In each instance, the court's determinations fell into one of 
three categories: (1) the alleged omissions or misrepresenta-
tions were not, in light of the circumstances, actually omissions 
or misrepresentations;43 (2) the alleged omissions or misrepre-
sentations were not material;44 or (3) the alleged omissions or 
misrepresentations were material, but in light of the circum-
stances, not misleading.45 Since the court therefore deter-
mined that the alleged misrepresentations and omissions, both 
individually and as a whole, did not significantly alter the total 
mix of information made available, the court concluded that 
FAC did not violate section 10(b).46 
v. CRITIQUE 
Despite the case-by-case analysis of Securities Exchange 
Act section 10(b) claims,47 some practical problems cannot be 
avoided. One such problem is that the courts have the luxury 
of analyzing a situation retrospectively. What may seem imma-
terial in light of the circumstances after the fact may have 
been highly probative during the transaction. McCormick illus-
trates this predicament, as the issue here was the materiality 
of information allegedly omitted or misrepresented concerning 
the likelihood of the sale of FFIC.46 As noted, the likelihood of 
the event in question is one prong of determining whether 
undisclosed or misrepresented information is material. 49 If 
discussion of the role of the "sophisticated business executive" in determining mao 
teriality, see infra notes 51·53 and accompanying text. 
43. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 878-83. The court held that the information of the 
second alleged omission was not true, and thus FAC could not be faulted for omit-
ting it. Id. at 879. The court further held that the statements complained of in 
the second, third, and sixth alleged misrepresentations did not amount to legal 
misrepresentations. Id. at 881-83. 
44. Id. at 878-83. For the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth alleged 
omissions, and the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged misrepresentations, the court 
held that the statements would not have significantly altered the total mix of 
information, and thus were immaterial as a matter of law. [d. 
45. Id. at 880-81. The court held that in light of the information which was 
provided to McCormick, the third alleged omission and the first alleged misrepre-
sentation were not misleading. Id. 
46. Id. at 883-84. 
47. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238-41 (1988); see supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
48. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 87'1 (9th Cir. 1994). 
49. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf 
8
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information concerning the likelihood itself is at issue, applica-
tion of a test based upon that likelihood becomes question-
able.50 
Other facets of the McCormick analysis are also notewor-
thy. At various points in the court's discussion, the Ninth Cir-
cuit holds the information immaterial based on the plaintiffs 
status as a "sophisticated business executive. "51 This condition 
is important, as each case is decided in light of the surround-
ing circumstances,52 but the court's virtually conclusive reli-
ance suggests a two-tiered system of analysis for materiality: 
one test for the reasonable investor and another less demand-
ing one for the "executive. "53 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit gives only cursory notice to the 
fact that the disclosure took place after the sale of the stock.54 
The circumstances suggest, however, that the court should 
have assigned greater weight to this detail. Because he had 
Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2nd Cir. 1968». 
50. The difficulties inherent in a retrospective attempt to discern the "likeli-
hood" of a speculative event are evident in the court's analysis. In addressing the 
sixth and seventh alleged omissions and the seventh alleged misrepresentation, the 
court reasons that because negotiations "nearly broke down in the middle of July," 
statements discounting the likelihood of the sale of FFIC made in May, the time 
of repurchase, would not be materially misleading. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 880-81, 
883. The court thus used information not yet available in May to assess the likeli-
hood of the sale of FFIC at that time. Id. 
51. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 878-84; see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying 
text for the court's explicit and implicit reliance on this characteristic. The court's 
analysis here is somewhat confusing. The conclusions seem to indicate that materi-
ality is inversely proportional to the sophistication of the stockholder. However, 
unless this case is merely the exception to the rule, the facts here do not support 
such a scheme. As a "sophisticated business executive," in light of the information 
disclosed, McCormick still thought the sale so unlikely that he forewent the oppor-
tunity to earn an additional five million dollars. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 874-75. 
52. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1963); see supra note 28. 
53. This is exemplified in the third alleged omission, in which the court held 
that FAC's "quasi-disclosure" was sufficient in light of plaintiffs background. Id. at 
879. Other courts have rejected that different standards might apply depending on 
the level of sophistication of the parties to the transaction. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (finding "no authority in the statute, the 
legislative history, or our previous decisions, for varying the standard of materiali-
ty depending on who brings the action or whether insiders are alleged to have 
profited"). 
54. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 874-75. McCormick and FAC consummated the sale 
of the stock on May 15, 1990. Id. at 874. The disclosure meeting took place on 
May 16, 1990. [d. at 874-75. 
9
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already signed one agreement to sell, McCormick had indicated 
to FAC his commitment to sell the stock.55 FAC thus enjoyed 
a superior bargaining position over McCormick during the 
disclosure meeting. In light of this indicated commitment and 
superior bargaining position, it was F AC's interest to keep 
disclosure to a minimum, for the transaction represented 
roughly five million dollars profit. 56 Since McCormick could 
have avoided the agreement,57 FAC clearly wanted to offer 
him no reason to do so. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that F AC had not violated the 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.58 The court con-
cluded that as a matter of law any additional information 
disclosed to McCormick concerning the likelihood of the sale of 
FFIC would not have significantly altered the total mix of 
available information, and the information that was disclosed 
was not materially misleading, particularly in light of 
McCormick's business sophistication. 59 Consequently, the 
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to F AC.60 
David E. Wanis' 
55. [d. 
56. [d. 
57. [d. at 875 n.2. 
58. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 884 (1994). 
59. [d. at 883·84. 
60. [d. at 885. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. 
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